Grounds for Divorce Under Hindu Law: All 9 Reasons Explained

When the Marriage Cannot Go On — Knowing Where You Stand

Most people who walk into a family lawyer's office are not asking whether they can get a divorce. They have already decided. The real question they bring is the next one: on what ground. Their friend says cruelty. Their cousin says desertion. The internet says "irretrievable breakdown". And they have no idea which one fits, which one is fastest, which one needs hard evidence, and which one will quietly fail at the first hearing.

Under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA), divorce is not a matter of feeling. The court does not grant it because the marriage has broken down emotionally. It grants it because one of the precise grounds in Section 13 is proved on the facts of your case. Picking the right ground is the most important strategic decision you will make in the entire case — it decides what evidence you must collect, how long the hearing will take, and whether the other side can throw your petition out on the very first appearance.

This guide walks through every single ground available under the HMA: the nine fault grounds in Section 13(1), the four extra grounds available only to the wife under Section 13(2), the two breakdown grounds in Section 13(1A), and the mutual-consent route in Section 13B. By the end you will know which ground is yours.

Three Categories of Divorce Under the Hindu Marriage Act

The HMA recognises three categories of divorce, and they look nothing like each other in practice:

1. Fault grounds (Section 13(1) HMA). One spouse has done something the law treats as serious enough to dissolve the marriage. The petitioner must prove the fault on the balance of probabilities. There are nine such grounds — adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, mental disorder, leprosy, venereal disease, renunciation, and presumption of death.
2. Breakdown grounds (Section 13(1A) HMA). No active fault, just the simple fact that a previous decree (judicial separation under Section 10 HMA, or restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 HMA) has not led to the parties living together again for at least one year. Either spouse can use these.
3. Mutual consent (Section 13B HMA). Both spouses jointly say to the court: we have lived separately for at least one year, we cannot live together, and we agree to dissolve the marriage. After a six-month cooling-off period (which courts can sometimes waive), the decree is granted.

Section 13(2) HMA adds four further grounds available only to the wife — covering pre-Act bigamous husbands, husbands guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality, husbands subject to a maintenance order with no resumption of cohabitation, and child-bride wives exercising the option of puberty.

Ground 1 — Adultery (Section 13(1)(i) HMA)

What it covers. Section 13(1)(i) HMA says the respondent has, after the solemnisation of the marriage, had voluntary sexual intercourse with any person other than his or her spouse. Before the 1976 amendment "living in adultery" was the test for divorce; today, even a single voluntary act of extra-marital sexual intercourse is enough.

What you must prove. Voluntariness is the key. A spouse who is raped does not commit adultery. The act must be after the marriage. Direct evidence is rarely available — courts therefore allow proof by circumstantial evidence and necessary inference, as long as the inference is the only reasonable one. The English bench in Dennis v. Dennis held that some penetration is required, however slight.

Examples from the case-law. In Nidhi Dalela v. Deepak Dalela the wife's repeated meetings with the husband's friend Arvind, sitting in his car behind the stadium, climbing hotel stairs together, and her refusal to stop seeing him despite warnings, led the court to grant divorce — the inescapable inference was adultery. Contrast Rajee v. Baburao, where a husband who simply alleged he saw his wife "talking to a man" was hit with Rs 10,000 of exemplary costs for a baseless allegation.

Adulterer as co-respondent. Most High Court rules require the alleged adulterer to be impleaded as a co-respondent; in some High Courts (e.g., Kerala) this is mandatory and the petition will be dismissed without it. Specific particulars — date, place, manner — must be pleaded.

The criminal angle. Section 497 of the IPC defined adultery as a criminal offence (since struck down by the Supreme Court). Even today, the matrimonial offence of adultery is wider than the IPC version: under the HMA, both spouses can be guilty.

Ground 2 — Cruelty (Section 13(1)(ia) HMA)

Cruelty is the most-used ground in Hindu divorce litigation today. Section 13(1)(ia) HMA covers it in just six words: "treated the petitioner with cruelty". The 1976 amendment removed the older requirement that cruelty must cause "reasonable apprehension of harm" — leaving the courts to decide on the facts of each case.

The classic definition. The English court in Russell v. Russell defined cruelty as conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health, or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. The Indian Supreme Court has since liberalised this in line with the Law Commission's 59th Report.

Physical and mental cruelty. Both are covered. Physical cruelty includes beating, throwing utensils (Asha v. Baldev), unnatural carnal relations, and acts of physical violence. Mental cruelty is harder to prove and is decided on cumulative effect — not on isolated incidents.

The high-water mark on mental cruelty is Dastane v. Dastane, where the Supreme Court accepted as cruelty a wife's calculated insults of the husband's family, tearing of the Mangalsutra, rubbing chilli powder on the child's tongue, and locking out the husband when he came home from office. Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddy held that demand of dowry per se is cruelty. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat recognised character assassination in pleadings as mental cruelty. A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur set the modern test: the conduct must be "grave and weighty" so that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with the respondent.

What does NOT count as cruelty. The "ordinary wear and tear of married life" — petty quarrels, presence of the mother-in-law, the wife refusing to resign her job, idiosyncrasies and temperamental oddities (as in Naval Kishore on standard of proof) are all below the threshold. Lord Denning's warning has been quoted by Indian courts: if the doors of cruelty are opened too wide, the institution of marriage itself is imperilled.

Specific patterns recognised as cruelty. Demand of dowry; persistent deprivation of cohabitation (Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta; Rita Nijhawan v. Balkrishna Nijhawan); termination of pregnancy without the husband's consent; refusal to have a child; false criminal complaints under Section 498-A IPC; false allegations of adultery in pleadings; threat to commit suicide as coercion. Cruelty does not need a specific intention — even unintentional conduct that causes serious mental anguish can qualify.

Ground 3 — Desertion for Two Years (Section 13(1)(ib) HMA)

Section 13(1)(ib) HMA requires desertion for a continuous period of not less than two years immediately before filing. Desertion has a precise legal meaning — it is not the same as merely living separately.

The four-element test. Two elements must exist on the deserting spouse's side: (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi). Two more elements must exist on the deserted spouse's side: (1) absence of consent, and (2) absence of any reasonable cause that drove the other to leave.

The leading authority is Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati — a Supreme Court decision under the older Bombay Hindu Divorce Act. The wife had left after the husband's allegations of intimacy with a family friend; later she expressed her wish to return. The Supreme Court held that her willingness to return ended the desertion, and dismissed the husband's petition. The case-line in Lachman v. Kriplani further developed the burden-of-proof rule: the deserted spouse must show desertion was without just cause.

Constructive desertion. Where one spouse, without leaving the house, makes life so unbearable that the other has to leave, the law treats that spouse as the deserter. This catches the dominant spouse who drives the other out by their conduct.

What is not desertion. Mere passage of time, however long, is not enough — both factum and animus must be proved. Living apart for 25 years without proof of intention to permanently end cohabitation does not, by itself, amount to desertion.

Ground 4 — Conversion to Another Religion (Section 13(1)(ii) HMA)

Section 13(1)(ii) HMA allows divorce where the respondent has ceased to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion. The word "conversion" is given its plain meaning — adoption of another religion in form and substance, not just in name.

Suresh Babu v. Leela held that even a conversion done with the consent of the other spouse is still a "conversion" within the meaning of this clause — the saving in Section 23 HMA does not, on a strict reading, exclude consensual conversions, though the bar against taking advantage of one's own wrong may apply.

Note: conversion of a married Hindu does not, by itself, dissolve the marriage. The marriage subsists until a court grants divorce. As Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India held in the bigamy context, a Hindu husband who converts to Islam and remarries is still bigamous because his Hindu marriage is still subsisting.

Ground 5 — Unsoundness of Mind / Mental Disorder (Section 13(1)(iii) HMA)

Section 13(1)(iii) HMA requires the respondent to be incurably of unsound mind or to have been suffering continuously or intermittently from mental disorder of such a kind and to such an extent that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with them. The 1976 amendment dropped the older "two-year duration" requirement.

The Explanation to Section 13(1)(iii) HMA defines "mental disorder" to include mental illness, arrested or incomplete development of mind, psychopathic disorder and any other disorder or disability of mind, including schizophrenia. "Psychopathic disorder" is defined as a persistent disorder or disability of mind resulting in abnormally aggressive or seriously irresponsible conduct.

Two elements must coexist. One — the respondent must actually be of unsound mind or suffering from a recognised mental disorder. Two — the disorder must be so serious that the petitioner cannot reasonably be expected to live with them. Neither element alone is enough.

What courts have accepted. Schizophrenia of an established nature with abnormal behaviour (Krishna Bhat v. Srimathi); paranoid schizophrenia confirmed by psychiatric evidence; epileptic psychosis of incurable nature. What courts have refused. Mere depression, eccentric habits, controllable bipolar illness, or temporary disturbance — these do not qualify (Homeshwar Singh v. Mira Singh; Devi Sharma v. Chander Mohan). Mere medical certificates without a clear chain of evidence are not enough.

Medical examination. The court has power to order medical examination. Refusal to undergo it allows the court to draw an adverse inference, but the petitioner must have a strong prima facie case before the order is made (K. Jasmine v. K. Balasundram).

Ground 6 — Virulent and Incurable Leprosy (Section 13(1)(iv) HMA)

Clause (iv) of Section 13(1) HMA — as originally enacted — allowed divorce where the other party "has been suffering from a virulent and incurable form of leprosy". Note two things. First, the disease must be both virulent (poisonous, capable of causing repulsion) and incurable. Modern medicine has made early-stage leprosy curable, narrowing the practical scope of this clause considerably.

Second, the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019 has since removed leprosy as a ground of divorce under HMA, in line with India's commitments under the Leprosy Elimination programme. Many older Hindu Law commentaries — written before 2019 — still discuss leprosy as a ground; the underlying authority is now of limited current use, but the historical context matters because there are still pending divorce petitions filed before the amendment.

Ground 7 — Communicable Venereal Disease (Section 13(1)(v) HMA)

Section 13(1)(v) HMA allows divorce where the respondent "has been suffering from venereal disease in a communicable form". The 1976 amendment removed the older three-year duration requirement and the requirement that the disease must not have been contracted from the petitioner.

The disease need not actually have been transmitted to the petitioner — the section only requires it to be in a communicable form. Mr. X v. Hospital Z recognised that a person who is HIV positive does not have an absolute right to marry, and a hospital does not violate any oath in disclosing the diagnosis to a fiance.

Ground 8 — Renunciation of the World (Section 13(1)(vi) HMA)

Section 13(1)(vi) HMA allows divorce where the respondent has "renounced the world by entering into a holy order". Two cumulative conditions must be met:

1. The respondent has actually renounced the world — withdrawing from all worldly affairs in the strict sense, sannyasa.
2. They have entered a recognised holy order with the relevant ceremonies and rites.

Persons who wear saffron clothes but continue family life — sadhus, bairagis who marry and live as householders — are not within this clause. A pujari at a temple, who continues family life, does not qualify either. Once strict renunciation is proved, the result under classical Hindu law is "civil death" — property passes to heirs as if the person had died — and the spouse is entitled to divorce. Note: renunciation does not ipso facto dissolve the marriage; the spouse must still obtain a decree.

Ground 9 — Presumption of Death (Section 13(1)(vii) HMA)

The ninth and last fault ground of divorce in Section 13(1)(vii) HMA reads: the respondent "has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive".

The clause is built on the principle in Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act, which raises a presumption of death where a person has not been heard of for at least seven years by those who would naturally have heard from them. The Hindu Marriage Act simply imports that presumption into matrimonial law. Effectively, this is desertion without proof of intention — the spouse is treated as having abandoned the marriage by their unexplained absence.

Practical caution: if the missing spouse later reappears, a marriage contracted by the petitioner after a Section 13(1)(vii) HMA decree is still valid (the decree was based on the legal presumption, not on actual death). But the original spouse's reappearance can complicate maintenance, inheritance and child-custody questions. A reasonable lawyer will pair this petition with appropriate documentation of the search efforts made.

Four Extra Grounds Available Only to the Wife — Section 13(2) HMA

Section 13(2) HMA adds four further grounds, exclusively for the wife. Article 15(3) of the Constitution permits special provisions for women, so these have been upheld against gender-discrimination challenges.

1. Pre-Act polygamous marriage — Section 13(2)(i) HMA. Where the husband had married before the HMA came into force in 1955 and another wife from that earlier marriage is still alive at the date of the petition, the second/later wife can seek divorce. After 70 years this ground is largely redundant in practice but is still on the statute book.
2. Husband guilty of rape, sodomy or bestiality — Section 13(2)(ii) HMA. The wife may seek divorce where the husband has, since the marriage, been guilty of rape (Section 375 IPC), sodomy or bestiality. A criminal conviction is not necessary; the offence must be independently proved in the divorce case. After judicial separation or where the wife is below 15 years, marital intercourse without consent is rape.
3. Maintenance order with no resumption of cohabitation — Section 13(2)(iii) HMA. Where a maintenance order has been passed against the husband under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (HAMA) or under Section 125 CrPC, and cohabitation has not been resumed for one year or more after that order, the wife can seek divorce. This is partly a breakdown ground in spirit.
4. Option of puberty — Section 13(2)(iv) HMA. Where the wife was given in marriage before the age of 15 (whether or not consummated) and she has repudiated the marriage after attaining 15 but before 18, she can obtain a decree. Ramesh Kumar v. Sunita Devi shows the timing trap — a petition filed when the wife was 13 was held premature; she had to wait until 15.

Breakdown Grounds — Section 13(1A) HMA

Section 13(1A) HMA gives both spouses a way to convert a stalled marriage into a divorce decree. There are two routes:

1. Section 13(1A)(i) HMA — there has been no resumption of cohabitation for a period of one year or upwards after the passing of a decree of judicial separation under Section 10 HMA.
2. Section 13(1A)(ii) HMA — there has been no restitution of conjugal rights for a period of one year or upwards after a decree of restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 HMA.

What is and is not a "wrong" under Section 23(1)(a) HMA. The Supreme Court in Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar held that mere disinclination to comply with a decree of restitution is not a "wrong" within the meaning of the bar to relief — otherwise the breakdown ground would be defeated by the very fact of non-compliance. The wrong must be something more — actual misconduct serious enough to disentitle the petitioner. Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan followed the same line. Hirachand v. Sunanda held that continued adultery and non-payment of maintenance after a decree are wrongs that disentitle the spouse from breakdown-ground divorce.

Irretrievable breakdown — not yet a statutory ground. Despite Law Commission recommendations and Supreme Court observations in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli calling for it, irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a stand-alone ground under the HMA. The Supreme Court has occasionally invoked Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve marriages on this basis, but ordinary divorce courts cannot.

Mutual Consent — Section 13B HMA, in One Page

Section 13B HMA, introduced by the 1976 amendment, provides for divorce by mutual consent. The procedure has two stages:

1. Joint petition under Section 13B(1) HMA. Both parties together file a petition stating they have been living separately for one year or more, that they cannot live together, and that they have mutually agreed the marriage should be dissolved.
2. Second motion under Section 13B(2) HMA. Not earlier than six months and not later than eighteen months after the first petition, the parties move the court a second time. The court satisfies itself about the marriage and the truth of the averments and grants the decree.

"Living separately" is a state of mind, not an address. Parties may live under one roof for circumstantial reasons and still be "living separately" if they no longer live as husband and wife. The Gujarat High Court in K. Girdharbhai Patel v. Prafulla Ben made this clear.

Withdrawal of consent. The Supreme Court in Sureshta Devi v. Om Parkash held that consent must be subsisting until the decree is passed — either spouse may withdraw consent in the six-month interval. Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri made a narrow distinction on facts (12 years of acrimony, husband had remarried). Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya reaffirmed Sureshta Devi as the correct rule. Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain shows the Supreme Court invoking Article 142 to grant the decree even after consent withdrawal where the wife had benefited from the property settlement.

Six-month waiver. The Supreme Court has held the six-month period to be directory in substance — courts can waive it where the parties have already lived separately for a considerable period and there is no chance of re-union. We've covered this in detail in our companion guide on the mutual-consent six-month rule and when it can be waived.

The One-Year Bar Before You Can Even File — Section 14 HMA

Section 14 HMA prevents a divorce petition from being filed within the first year of marriage, except by leave of the court on grounds of exceptional hardship to the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent. This is mandatory in form. Mere averment that the spouses cannot live together is not enough.

The leave application is decided with regard to the welfare of any children of the marriage and the prospects of reconciliation. If the leave is later found to have been obtained by misrepresentation, the court can postpone the operation of the decree by one year. We've explained this trap, and the standard exceptions, in detail in our guide on the one-year bar on divorce under Hindu law.

What Should I Actually Do Now?

1. Identify your strongest ground first. Re-read Sections 13(1), 13(1A), 13(2) and 13B HMA against your facts. Most cases fit one or two grounds, not all of them. The right ground is the one with the cleanest evidence trail — not the most dramatic one.
2. Check the one-year bar (Section 14 HMA). If your marriage is less than one year old, you cannot file unless you can show exceptional hardship or exceptional depravity. Plan accordingly.
3. Pull the evidence together before drafting. Photographs, WhatsApp chats, medical records, FIR copies, doctor's prescriptions, witnesses to specific incidents. Cruelty cases especially die on weak evidence. Adultery cases must be specific on dates, places and circumstances — the adulterer must usually be impleaded.
4. Watch the Section 23 HMA bars. The court will refuse relief if you are taking advantage of your own wrong, if there has been condonation, collusion, or unnecessary delay. A spouse who has clearly forgiven the cruelty by resuming cohabitation cannot cite the same cruelty later.
5. Decide between contested and mutual consent. If both spouses agree, Section 13B HMA is far faster and cheaper. The trap is the six-month waiting period and the risk of consent withdrawal — both manageable with proper legal advice.
6. Plan the parallel claims early. Maintenance and alimony, child custody, and protection from domestic violence are usually filed alongside the divorce, not after. A poorly sequenced filing can weaken the divorce itself.
7. Talk to a matrimonial lawyer before drafting. The strategic decisions made at the petition stage are very hard to undo later. A short consultation can save months.

A Final Word — Pick the Right Ground, Save Years

Hindu divorce law is sometimes painted as restrictive and slow. It is neither. Section 13 HMA gives nine separate fault grounds, four wife-only grounds, two breakdown grounds and a mutual-consent route — that is sixteen distinct legal pathways. The real difficulty is choosing the right one, evidencing it cleanly, and avoiding the Section 23 HMA bars that quietly kill petitions.

If your marriage has reached a point where the relationship is not retrievable, do not waste years filing on the wrong ground. A focused petition on the right ground, backed by tight evidence and filed at the right time, can move from filing to decree in a matter of months. A petition built on emotion and weak ground can drag on for years, achieving nothing.

Frequently Asked Questions

How many grounds for divorce are there under the Hindu Marriage Act?

There are nine fault grounds under Section 13(1) HMA — adultery, cruelty, desertion, conversion, mental disorder, leprosy, venereal disease, renunciation and presumption of death. On top of that, Section 13(2) HMA gives the wife four additional grounds (pre-Act polygamy, husband's rape/sodomy/bestiality, maintenance-order non-cohabitation, and option of puberty). Section 13(1A) HMA adds two breakdown grounds (no resumption of cohabitation after judicial separation, no compliance with restitution decree). Section 13B HMA provides for mutual consent. That is sixteen distinct legal routes in total.

Is irretrievable breakdown of marriage a ground for divorce in India?

Not as a stand-alone statutory ground under the Hindu Marriage Act. The Law Commission and the Supreme Court in Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli have repeatedly recommended adding it, but Parliament has not yet done so. The Supreme Court occasionally dissolves marriages on this basis using its extraordinary power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Ordinary family courts and High Courts cannot. Practical takeaway: build your case around one of the actual Section 13 grounds, even if the underlying reality is breakdown.

How fast can I get a divorce on cruelty?

It depends on the strength of your evidence and whether the case is contested. A clear cruelty case with documentary evidence (medical records, FIRs, WhatsApp chats, witness statements) can reach trial in 12–18 months in many jurisdictions. A weak case, or one that the respondent contests aggressively, can take three to five years or more. Section 13(1)(ia) HMA itself does not specify a duration of cruelty — even a single grave incident can suffice if it is grave and weighty enough, as A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur held.

My husband has not lived with me for the last 5 years. Is that desertion?

Possibly, but separation alone is not desertion. Section 13(1)(ib) HMA requires both factum (the act of living apart) and animus deserendi (the intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end). Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati is the leading authority. You also need to show that you did not consent and gave him no reasonable cause to leave. If he has expressed willingness to return at any point, the desertion may be treated as ended from that moment. Get a lawyer to map your facts against the four-element test before filing.

Can a wife divorce her husband on the ground of adultery alone?

Yes. Under Section 13(1)(i) HMA both spouses are equally entitled to seek divorce on adultery — the matrimonial offence applies to both. After the 1976 amendment, even a single voluntary act of extra-marital sexual intercourse is enough; the older requirement of "living in adultery" is gone. The wife must impleads the alleged adulteress as a co-respondent under most High Court rules, and must plead specific particulars of date, place and circumstance. Direct evidence is rarely available — courts allow proof by inescapable inference from circumstances.

Is leprosy still a ground for divorce in India?

No, not after the Personal Laws (Amendment) Act, 2019. Earlier Section 13(1)(iv) HMA allowed divorce on the ground of "virulent and incurable" leprosy. Parliament has since removed leprosy as a ground under HMA, the Special Marriage Act and several other personal-law statutes, in line with India's leprosy elimination commitments. Petitions filed on this ground before the amendment may still be running, but no fresh petitions can be filed today on leprosy alone.

What is the option of puberty under Hindu law?

Section 13(2)(iv) HMA allows a wife who was given in marriage before the age of 15 to repudiate the marriage after attaining 15 but before attaining 18 — and obtain a decree of divorce. The marriage need not have been consummated. The age can be proved by horoscope, school certificate, medical evidence or other proof. Ramesh Kumar v. Sunita Devi shows the timing trap — a wife who filed at 13 had her petition rejected as premature; she must wait until 15. The right is borrowed from the Muslim-law concept of khayar-ul-bulugh, but is given here only to the wife.

Can I get divorce if my spouse has been missing for 7 years?

Yes, under Section 13(1)(vii) HMA — the presumption-of-death ground. The clause requires that the respondent "has not been heard of as being alive for a period of seven years or more by those persons who would naturally have heard of it, had that party been alive". The principle is borrowed from Section 108 of the Indian Evidence Act. You must plead and lead evidence about the search efforts you and the family made. If the missing spouse reappears later, your divorce decree remains valid because it was based on a legal presumption, not on actual death.

Can the husband apply for divorce under Section 13(2) HMA grounds?

No. Section 13(2) HMA reserves four grounds for the wife alone — pre-Act polygamous husbands, husbands guilty of rape/sodomy/bestiality, husbands subject to a maintenance order with no resumption of cohabitation, and the option of puberty. The constitutional challenge against this asymmetry has been rejected by the courts on the basis of Article 15(3) of the Constitution, which permits special provisions for women. The husband can still rely on any of the nine fault grounds in Section 13(1) HMA or the breakdown grounds in Section 13(1A) HMA, but not the four wife-only ones.

Mutual consent or contested divorce — which should I choose?

Mutual consent under Section 13B HMA is faster, cheaper and far less acrimonious. It typically takes about 6 to 18 months. The trade-off: you must agree on terms (alimony, custody, property), and either side can withdraw consent before the decree (Sureshta Devi v. Om Parkash). Contested divorce under Section 13(1) HMA is slower and harder, but it is your only option if the other side will not cooperate. A pragmatic middle path is to start with a contested petition on a strong ground and, when the other side sees the cards, convert to mutual consent. Most experienced family-law lawyers steer the case in this direction.

For more articles on Indian law, visit the Pinaka Legal Blog. For queries, call +91 8595704798 or email info@pinakalegal.com.