What Are Disqualifications From Inheritance?
Picture a family gathered after the death of a patriarch. His property needs to be divided. But one of the heirs is in prison — convicted for his father's murder. Another heir converted to a different religion ten years ago and had children after the conversion. A third heir is deaf. Can any of them inherit?
This is the question of disqualifications from inheritance — situations where the law specifically says a person who would otherwise be an heir simply cannot take the property.
Under the old Hindu law that existed before 1956, the list of disqualifications was enormous. Physical disability — blindness, deafness, being born without a limb — could bar you from inheriting. Unchastity in a widow was a ground. Even certain diseases disqualified an heir. These rules caused tremendous injustice, because a person had no control over whether they were born deaf or lost an arm in an accident.
The Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HSA) swept most of those grounds away. Sections 24 to 28 of the Act now define the only grounds on which a Hindu can be disqualified from inheriting. Every other ground — physical disability, unchastity, caste, lunacy — has been abolished. The list under the Act is exhaustive, not illustrative.
This article explains each surviving ground in plain language, with real court decisions, so you know exactly where things stand — whether you fear losing your own share or believe a co-heir should be barred.
Section 24 — Remarriage of Certain Widows (Now Repealed)
When the HSA was originally enacted in 1956, Section 24 laid down one specific remarriage-based disqualification. It said that if the widow of a son, or the widow of a son's son, or the widow of a brother had remarried before the succession opened — meaning before the date of the death of the person whose property was being divided — she would lose her right to inherit in that capacity.
The logic at the time was: her right to inherit flowed from her marital connection to the deceased lineage. If she had already moved on into a new marriage before that right crystallised, she was treated as having severed that connection.
However, this disqualification was widely criticised as discriminatory. A widow's remarriage is her personal choice and her right to live with dignity. Penalising her for it — by stripping away property she would otherwise inherit — was seen as deeply unfair.
The Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (effective 9 September 2005) deleted Section 24 entirely. From that date onwards, the remarriage of a son's widow, son's son's widow, or brother's widow is no longer a disqualification. These widows inherit on an equal footing with other heirs regardless of whether they have remarried.
This is particularly important to know if you are a widow in this category: if someone tells you that you cannot inherit because you remarried, they are quoting a law that no longer exists. The ground was abolished nearly two decades ago.
Section 25 — The Murderer Loses Everything
Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act is unambiguous:
A person who commits murder or abets the commission of murder shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of the person murdered, or any other property in furtherance of the succession to which he or she committed or abetted the commission of the murder.
There are two distinct limbs to this disqualification.
First limb: The murderer cannot inherit the property of the person they killed. If a son murders his father, he cannot inherit his father's estate. This is the obvious and intuitive part.
Second limb: The murderer also loses any property whose succession was altered or accelerated by the murder. This is the more subtle — and more powerful — part of the section. The source material gives this illustration: suppose A is the grandson of P through P's daughter D. Normally, A (grandson through daughter) would not inherit from P while D (the daughter) is alive — D comes first. If A murders D specifically to jump up the line and inherit P's estate, A is disqualified not just from D's property but from P's estate too, because the murder advanced his position in that succession.
The principle is rooted in a Latin maxim: Nemo ex suo delicto meliorem suam conditionem facere potest — no one can improve their position through their own wrong. It is also a rule of public policy: courts will not allow a person who has committed the most heinous act possible against another human being to profit from that act.
In Vallikannu v R Singaperumal (2005) 6 SCC 622, the Supreme Court held that where a coparcener son murders his father, the disqualification is not limited to just the convicted son. It extends to anyone who claims the estate through him — including his wife. The wife of a murderer cannot inherit the father-in-law's estate through her husband, because her claim derives entirely from a right that has been extinguished.
The courts have also held — consistently — that this principle applies to testamentary succession too, not just to intestate succession. If you are named in a will but you murdered the testator, you still cannot take the bequest.
Where the bar does not apply: if the succession is not to the estate of the murder victim but to the estate of a third person who happened to inherit from the victim, the disqualification does not travel that far. In Jamuna Dass v Board of Revenue AIR 1973 All 397, the Allahabad High Court clarified this boundary.
Who Counts as a "Murderer" Under Section 25?
This is where families sometimes get confused — especially when a criminal case ended in acquittal, or when the conviction was for a lesser offence than murder under Section 300 of the Indian Penal Code.
The courts have been clear: the word "murderer" in Section 25 is not used in the narrow technical sense of Section 300 IPC (which defines murder as intentional killing with specific states of mind). It is used in a wider, popular sense — covering culpable homicide, unlawful killing, and even manslaughter in certain situations.
In N Sitaramaiah v Ramakrishnaiah, a person participated in an attack on his father along with others who were convicted of murder. He himself was given benefit of the doubt on the murder charge and convicted only under Section 324 IPC (voluntarily causing hurt). The court still held him disqualified under Section 25 HSA, because his participation in the violent act that caused his father's death was established.
A person convicted under Section 304 IPC (culpable homicide not amounting to murder) would also be disqualified.
What about acquittal? If a criminal court acquits the person, the situation is more nuanced. The civil court is not automatically bound by a criminal acquittal — it can and should examine the evidence independently. However, if the criminal court has made a clear factual finding — for example, that the death was a suicide and not a murder — the civil court would ordinarily follow that finding unless additional evidence overturns it.
In Sarita Chauwhan v Chetan Chauwhan, a widow was prosecuted for murdering her husband but was clearly acquitted. The court held she was entitled to inherit — the acquittal stood.
In GS Sadashiva v MC Srinivasan AIR 2001 Kar 453, the Karnataka High Court held that a mere charge of murder that is not proved at the criminal trial does not disqualify. An unproven allegation is not a disqualification.
One more important point: suicide of the victim does not trigger Section 25. In Talla Palli Kasi Visalakshmi v Tallapalli Venkata Vijayalakshmi AIR 2004 AP 160, the Andhra Pradesh High Court held that a widow cannot be barred from inheriting simply because her conduct was said to be responsible for her husband's suicide. Section 25 requires commission or abetment of murder — not moral culpability for a person's decision to take their own life.
Similarly, in Kenchava Kom Sanvellappa Somasagar v Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar AIR 1924 PC 209, the Privy Council established — long before the HSA — that even apart from statute, justice and public policy bar a murderer from inheriting the estate of the person they killed. Section 25 codified what equity had already recognised.
Section 26 — Children Born After a Parent Converts to Another Religion
The personal religion of an heir is largely irrelevant under the HSA. After the Caste Disabilities Removal Act, 1850, conversion to another religion no longer disqualifies the converting person from inheriting. A Hindu who converts to Christianity or Islam does not lose the right to inherit from their Hindu parents.
Section 26, however, draws a different and more targeted line. It says:
Where before or after the commencement of this Act, a Hindu has ceased or ceases to be a Hindu by conversion to another religion, children born to him or her after such conversion and their descendants shall be disqualified from inheriting the property of any of their Hindu relatives, unless such children or descendants are Hindus at the time when the succession opens.
The disqualification under Section 26 applies to children born after the conversion — not to the convert themselves, and not to children born before the conversion.
A worked example: Rajesh is a Hindu. He converts to Islam in 2005. He had a daughter, Priya, in 2003 — before the conversion. He had a son, Tariq, in 2008 — after the conversion. When Rajesh's Hindu mother dies intestate in 2026:
- Priya (born before conversion) — is entitled to inherit, because she was born while Rajesh was still Hindu.
- Tariq (born after conversion) — is disqualified, unless at the time of the grandmother's death he himself is a Hindu (i.e., he has reconverted or was raised as a Hindu).
The saving clause is important: if the child born after conversion has returned to Hinduism or identifies as Hindu by the date the succession opens, the disqualification does not apply. Religion at the time of the opening of succession — the date of the intestate's death — is what matters, not religion at birth.
In Narsimbulu v Manemma AIR 1988 AP 309, the Andhra Pradesh High Court confirmed this provision and emphasised that the HSA disqualifications are exhaustive — the old Hindu law disabilities have been abolished.
Section 27 — What Happens to the Share of a Disqualified Person?
When someone is disqualified, their share does not simply disappear or go to the government. Section 27 provides the answer:
When any person is disqualified from inheriting any property under this Act, it shall devolve as if such person had died before the intestate.
The disqualified person is treated as though they never survived the intestate — as if they pre-deceased the person whose property is being divided. The succession then works down through the next tier of heirs.
A practical illustration: A has a son S and a grandson GS (S's son). S murders A. Under Section 25, S is disqualified. Under Section 27, S is treated as though he died before A. So GS now inherits — as the son of a predeceased son — exactly as he would have if S had died naturally before A.
Crucially, the disqualification is personal to the disqualified heir. It does not extend to their legitimate children. GS does not suffer for his father S's crime. This is a deliberate policy choice — innocent descendants should not be punished for a wrong they did not commit.
However — and this is the point clarified in Vallikannu v R Singaperumal (2005) 6 SCC 622 — anyone who claims the property through the disqualified person (as opposed to claiming it in their own independent right) is also excluded. The wife of the murderer-son does not have an independent right to the grandfather's property. Her right runs through her husband. Since her husband is treated as non-existent, she too cannot claim.
In Janak Rani v State, a husband murdered his wife and was convicted under Section 304 IPC. The husband then argued that since he could not inherit from her, the property should go to his parents. The court rejected this entirely: Section 27 creates a legal fiction that the disqualified person died before the intestate. Since the husband did not survive the wife in law, no one can claim through him. His parents had no independent claim to the wife's estate — they could only claim through their son, which was not permissible.
For anyone tracking an inheritance dispute involving a testamentary succession (a will), the same principle of Section 27 applies — the disqualified person is treated as pre-deceased even for the purposes of construing their entitlement under a will.
Section 28 — Disease, Defect, Deformity: Never a Ground
Section 28 is a clean and definitive abolition of all the old Hindu law disqualifications based on physical or mental condition:
No person shall be disqualified from succeeding to any property on the ground of any disease, defect or deformity, or save as provided in this Act, on any other ground whatsoever.
Before 1956, a person born with congenital blindness could be barred from inheriting. So could someone born deaf-mute, without a limb, or with congenital impotence. Lunatics were also barred — though if a lunatic became sane, the right revived (without disturbing the estate already vested elsewhere). These rules were vestiges of ancient law that linked ritual capacity with inheritance rights.
Section 28 abolishes all of this. No disease, no physical defect, no deformity can disqualify a person from inheriting. A person born blind, deaf, without limbs, with Down syndrome, with schizophrenia — none of these conditions removes the right to inherit under Hindu law. The only grounds for disqualification are the ones the Act expressly mentions (Sections 25 and 26, and formerly Section 24 before its repeal).
Section 28 also contains a residual sweep: "on any other ground whatsoever" — except as provided in the Act. This means unchastity, illegitimacy (save specific situations), caste, the old concept of sagotra or sapravar — none of these operate as disqualifications anymore. The Act is the complete and exhaustive statement of when you can be barred from inheriting.
In Yellavajbala Surayya v Yellavajbalu Subbamma (1920) ILR 43 Mad 4, long before the HSA, the Madras High Court had already signalled the direction of travel. After 1956, Narsimbulu v Manemma AIR 1988 AP 309 confirmed the exhaustive nature of the Act's list. Even unchastity — which under Mitakshara law once disqualified a widow — is now irrelevant, as confirmed in Khagendra Nath Ghosh v Karunadhar Kala AIR 1978 Cal 43.
One practical scenario arises in families where an elderly heir has dementia or a serious mental illness. Sometimes co-heirs attempt to argue that this disqualifies them from inheriting. Under the HSA, this argument has absolutely no legal foundation. Mental illness is a disease or defect — Section 28 expressly says it is not a disqualification. The heir with dementia still inherits. The estate may need a guardian or administrator, but the inheritance right itself is intact.
What Should I Actually Do Now?
Whether you are worried that someone is trying to disqualify you, or you believe another heir should be disqualified, here is a clear action plan:
- Identify which section applies. The only active grounds are Section 25 (murder/abetment) and Section 26 (children born after conversion). Section 24 was repealed in 2005. Section 28 says physical or mental conditions are never grounds. Be sure you are working with the right provision.
- If Section 25 is involved, gather the criminal court record. Was there a conviction? For what offence? Was there an acquittal? On what grounds? The civil court can examine the evidence independently, but a criminal court's factual findings carry significant weight.
- If Section 26 is involved, establish the timeline. When did the conversion happen? Were the children born before or after? Are those children themselves Hindu today? All of these facts are critical and can be proved through documentary evidence (birth certificates, conversion records, etc.).
- Do not rely on old Hindu law disqualifications. If a family member or a village panchayat tells you that you cannot inherit because you are disabled, ill, of a certain caste, or because of a woman's conduct — that is legally wrong. These grounds have been abolished since 1956.
- File a civil suit for declaration of right. If someone is denying your share on a disqualification ground — valid or invalid — the remedy is a declaration suit in civil court. The court will determine whether the disqualification applies and, if it does not, will declare your entitlement.
- If you are a widow who has remarried: Section 24 was repealed in 2005. Your remarriage does not bar you from inheriting as a son's widow, son's son's widow, or brother's widow if the succession opened after 9 September 2005. If someone tells you otherwise, they are wrong.
- Consult a lawyer before making concessions. In distress, heirs sometimes sign partition deeds or renounce rights under pressure from co-heirs who cite non-existent disqualifications. A lawyer can tell you quickly whether the claimed disqualification is real or fictional. Check your rights with regard to the full body of inheritance rights under the HSA before agreeing to anything.
- Act before limitation runs. Suits relating to inheritance have limitation periods. Delay can cost you the right to sue even if you are legally correct on the merits. Do not wait.
You Still Have Options — Do Not Walk Away From Your Share
The law under the Hindu Succession Act is deliberately limited in who it allows to be barred from inheriting. The legislature in 1956 recognised that the old Hindu law had created far too many ways to strip people — especially women and people with disabilities — of their rightful property. The Act restricted disqualifications to two active grounds: committing or abetting murder, and being born after a parent's conversion to another religion (unless yourself a Hindu when succession opens).
Everything else — physical condition, mental condition, unchastity, remarriage (since 2005), caste, illegitimacy in most situations — cannot bar you. The courts have consistently upheld this position.
If you are facing a situation where someone is claiming you have lost your right to inherit, or if you have reason to believe a co-heir genuinely falls within Section 25 or 26, the answer is not to accept the situation quietly. It is to get proper legal advice, understand what the law actually says, and — if necessary — go to court.
The Pinaka Legal team works on inheritance and succession disputes regularly. If you are dealing with a disqualification issue — whether you are the person being excluded or the family trying to invoke the disqualification — speaking to a lawyer who understands this area of law is the most important step you can take. Call +91 8595704798 or email info@pinakalegal.com for a confidential first conversation.
Written by the Pinaka Legal Editorial Team. For queries, call +91 8595704798 or email info@pinakalegal.com.
Frequently Asked Questions
Can a person who killed someone still inherit their property under Hindu law?
No. Section 25 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 expressly disqualifies a person who commits or abets murder from inheriting the property of the person they killed. They are also disqualified from any other property whose succession was altered or accelerated by the murder. The Supreme Court in Vallikannu v R Singaperumal (2005) 6 SCC 622 confirmed this extends to persons claiming through the murderer as well.
Is remarriage a disqualification from inheriting under Hindu law?
It used to be. Section 24 of the HSA originally barred a son's widow, son's son's widow, or brother's widow from inheriting if she had remarried before succession opened. However, the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 repealed Section 24 with effect from 9 September 2005. Since that date, remarriage is no longer a disqualification for any widow under the HSA.
My family member has a disability. Does that mean they cannot inherit?
No — absolutely not. Section 28 of the Hindu Succession Act expressly says that no person can be disqualified from inheriting on the ground of any disease, defect, or deformity. Physical disabilities, mental illness, congenital conditions — none of these bar a person from inheriting. Any attempt to exclude a disabled heir on this ground has no legal basis whatsoever.
Can I inherit from my Hindu grandparents if my parent converted to another religion?
It depends on two things: when your parent converted, and what religion you yourself follow. Under Section 26 HSA, only children born after a parent's conversion are disqualified — and even then, the disqualification does not apply if you are a Hindu at the time the succession opens (the date your grandparent dies). If you were born before your parent converted, you are not disqualified at all.
If a person is disqualified from inheriting, does their share go to the government?
No. Under Section 27 HSA, the property devolves as if the disqualified person had died before the intestate. So the next set of heirs — whoever would have inherited had the disqualified person predeceased the deceased — take the share instead. For example, if a murderer-son is disqualified, his children (the deceased's grandchildren) may inherit in his place, as they would have if he had died first.
Does a criminal acquittal mean the person can definitely inherit?
Not automatically. A civil court is not bound by a criminal court's verdict, though it gives it significant weight. If the criminal court acquitted based on a clear factual finding — for example, that the death was suicide, not murder — the civil court will ordinarily follow that. But if the acquittal was on technical grounds or benefit of the doubt, the civil court can still examine the evidence and reach its own conclusion on whether Section 25 applies.
Does disqualifications from inheritance under Hindu law apply to wills too, or only intestate succession?
Both. The courts have confirmed that the principle behind Section 25 — that a murderer cannot profit from their crime — applies to testamentary succession as well. Even if you are named as a beneficiary in a will, if you murdered the testator, you cannot take the bequest. The same applies to Section 26: if you are disqualified, the bequest to you fails.
My co-heir is claiming I am disqualified because of my unchaste conduct. Is this valid?
No. Unchastity was a disqualification under old Mitakshara Hindu law but has been completely abolished by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. Section 28 says no person can be disqualified on 'any other ground whatsoever' except as specifically provided in the Act. Unchastity is not a ground under the Act. The Calcutta High Court confirmed this in Khagendra Nath Ghosh v Karunadhar Kala AIR 1978 Cal 43.
What if the disqualified person has already taken possession of the property?
A person disqualified under the HSA has no legal title to the property. If they have taken possession, the entitled heirs can file a suit for declaration of right and recovery of possession. Under Section 27, the disqualified person is treated as never having inherited — so any possession they hold is without legal basis and can be challenged in civil court.
Does the disqualification under Section 25 apply only if there is a criminal conviction?
A conviction makes the case straightforward, but Section 25 does not require one. A civil court can independently find that a person committed or abetted murder even if no criminal prosecution was initiated or if the prosecution failed. Even apart from the HSA, the Privy Council in Kenchava Kom Sanvellappa Somasagar v Girimallappa Channappa Somasagar AIR 1924 PC 209 held that public policy bars a murderer from inheriting the victim's estate regardless of statute.
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